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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with four questions about the potential power 
of A over B with respect to X: (1) Can it be defined unambiguously?
(2) Is its base inert? (3) Is it a unidimensional attribute of A 
and, if not, what sense does it make to talk about "power struc­
tures?” (4) Does it lead to spurious inferences about power? 
Potential power, what A could do to B if B did not do X and A cared 
enough about X, is defined more exactly in part jL. In part i¿ it is 
(experimentally) shown that the base of A's power is not inert: B's 
perceptions of A's potential power have an effect that does not 
depend on A expressing preferences, promising rewards, or threaten­
ing penalties. This is true even if B has no prior knowledge of the 
probability that A rewards compliance or penalizes noncompliance.
In fact, if it is possible to do nothing (to nondecide) it is true 
even if B does not know A's preferences. In part iii, it is shown 
that potential power, like actual power, is a multidimensional 
relation. Therefore, with respect to observable compliance it is, 
like actual power, impermanent, issue-specific, and partially- 
ordered. With respect to power-dependence relations that underlie 
acts, however, although such relations are also multidimensional and 
only partially-ordered, they are relatively stable and general (not 
issue-specific) and it therefore makes sense to talk about "power 
structures" and to construct more complex systems out of them. This 
does not lead to spurious inferences made from false perceptions of 
potential power if (and only if) ad hoc explanation of power's 
effects is given up in favor of a systematic theoretical approach.
Introduct ion
Every collective choice among k alternatives has a k+1th 
alternative, to do nothing, called a nondecision. (See Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; 1963; 1970; but cf. also Dahl, 1957, pp. 209-10.) Any 
choice between X and Y is really a choice between X and Y and not 
making a choice, 0. This is frequently unnoticed because choices 
are decomposable into two parts, decisions (made between X and Y) 
and metadecisions (made between ©X or Y° and 0) (cf. Zelditch, et 
al, 1983). The House debates school prayer; its Rules Committee 
decides whether to debate it or not. Often, as in this example, the 
analytic distinction between decisions and metadecisions is also an 
empirical distinction between stages of the policy process: 
Metadecisions are part of the predecision politics of an issue. 
Because they are more salient, decisions get noticed, metadecisions 
do not. But also, metadecisions arise in two ways: They can be 
made explicitly, by deciding not to decide an issue; or they can be 
made implicitly, by not deciding to decide. The House Rules 
Committee may vote on whether or not to take up school prayer in 
1 9 8 3; it may simply neglect to take up a long-range energy policy.
It is implicit metadecisions that are especially likely to go 
unnoticed; but Bachrach and Baratz (1962) have argued that they have 
special features that make them important for the study of the less 
visible aspects of power.
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The less visible aspects of power are those that do not depend 
on its actual exercise: B complies with known or inferred 
preferences of A without A overtly expressing them, promising any 
inducements, or threatening any penalties. They arise in the first 
instance from the "law of anticipated reactions" (Friedrich, 1963; 
Ford, 1 9 8 1). Sentries rarely fire their weapons; most people 
anticipate them and choose a course of action that makes it 
unnecessary. But implicit nondecisions extend the scope of 
invisible power further because they do not require that B know or 
even infer A's preferences. B does not have to know A's preferences 
because nondecisions do not reveal his own. Decisions are visible 
contests: By choosing X, B publicly commits himself to one 
alternative, publicly rejects the other. To comply with A's 
preferences, B must therefore know or infer them. To do nothing is 
safe whatever A's preferences. All it does is to give to A a 
decisive role in determining the group's agenda. If A is in favor 
of deciding an issue, B incurs no penalty by not raising it first.
If A is against deciding the issue, B is rewarded for doing nothing 
by the penalty foregone. None of this depends on A's actual 
intentions. A may in fact not be aware that B is making such 
choices. They depend not on intentions but on the sheer existence 
of a power structure, on potential rather than actual power.
Potential power is an essential tool for the analysis of the 
less visible aspects of power. We take it to refer to what one 
actor, A could do to overcome the resistence of another, B, i_f B did
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not comply with A's wish that B do something, say X, _if A's 
preferences for X were sufficiently intense. This, in turn, we take 
to refer to the base of A's power over B, meaning the resources 
possessed by A that are instrumental to goals valued by B.
Potential power, power as a capacity, is what Weber meant by power 
(19^7, p. 152). It is what most sociologists of power since Weber 
have meant by it (for example, Bierstedt, 1950; Gamson, 1968; 
Goldhammer and Shils, 1939; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Wrong, 1968;
1979). It is also what a wide range of social psychologists have 
meant by it, from field theorists (Cartwright, 1959; Wolfe, 1959) to 
subjective-expected-utility theorists (Tedeschi, et al, 1973)» to 
even some behaviorists (Emerson, 1972). It plays an essential role 
in some decision theories (Harsanyi, 1962; Karlsson, 1961). It has 
become increasingly prevalent in political science (Alker, 1973; 
Pollard and Mitchell, 1972; Nagel, 1968; 1975; Wagner, 1969). It is 
nevertheless a controversial concept. A whole generation of 
behavioral political scientists has vigorously objected to it. (See 
especially Dahl, 1957; 1958; 1961; Kornberg and Perry, 1966; Polsby, 
1980.)
The objections are that (1) potential power is an ambiguous 
concept; (2) if it is identified with the base of power it can have 
no effect because the base, by itself, is inert; and (3) it implies 
that power is a unidimensional attribute, which is contradicted by 
observation -- a feature that can be removed (by making power sub­
jective) but only at the expense of a paradox (of "false belief").
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The present paper argues that potential power can be precisely 
defined, that it has an observable effect that is independent of 
actual power, and that it is neither a unidimensional attribute nor 
paradoxical. This argument is divided into three parts. The 
objective of part is to define potential power. Its ambiguities 
derive in part from confusing distinct processes, each referred to 
as "power," and in part from a poverty of vocabulary for several 
distinct ideas uncovered by deeper analysis of "potential." Part _i 
is tedious, it will be tiresome to anyone familiar with the subject, 
but it is inescapable if we are to accomplish the objectives of 
parts ri and iii. The objective of part i_i is to test two 
hypotheses about the relation between the base and amount of A's 
power when, holding scope and domain constant, the base varies but A 
exerts no overt power over B. The findings reported in part ii_ 
justify the assumption that potential power has an effect that is 
independent of actual power. Part iii studies the implications of a 
theory of potential power in more detail. If one is willing to 
accept some very reasonable assumptions (explanation as a goal, a 
distinction between observable acts of compliance or noncompliance 
and underlying power-dependence relations, a place for objective as 
well as subjective potential power), it can be shown that potential 
power is a multi-dimensional relation but can still be sensibly 
talked about as a "structure" without the paradox of false belief.
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I. What is Potential Power?-------------------------------------------------
Few theories of power have been able to escape the fact that in 
explaining compliance by B, the resources of A play an essential 
role. This leads most theories quite naturally to a concept of 
potential power. But different theories have nevertheless meant a 
number of different things by it. The ambiguity of potential power 
has to do in part with the ambiguities of "potential": Hunter 
(1953) uses it to mean possible power, the total quantity of 
resources possessed by A; Gamson ( 1968) uses it to mean usable 
power, the quantity of A's resources ready for use; Wrong (1968) 
argues it should refer to latent power, which is based on B's 
beliefs about what A could do if it were important enough to A; 
Harsanyi (1962) uses it to refer to the rate at which x increases 
with a unit increase in y, where x might be the scope, domain, or 
amount of A's power and y might be the base or the exercise of A's 
power -- hence, to refer to the derivative of a function or what he 
calls power in the schedule sense; Nagel (1975) uses it to refer to 
one of these rates, the rate of change in the amount of A's power 
over B.
But the ambiguities of "potential" are multiplied by those of 
"power". "Power" has so many difficulties that some investigators 
(most importantly March, 1966 and Riker, 1964) prefer to abandon it 
altogether. It is the ambiguities of "power" more than the ambigu­
ities of "potential" that make many inferences about potential power 
doubtful, and it is these that must be dealt with first of all.
However, at least since Harsanyi (1962), a surprising amount of 
agreement has emerged that whatever it is, power is a relation the 
adequate description of which must refer to:
(1) the bases of power (the bases of A's power over B are the 
resources possessed by A that are instrumental to the 
goals of B);
(2) the means of power (the ways in which A uses these 
resources to change the behavior of B);
(3) the strength of power (the costs to B if B does not comply 
with demands by A);
(¿4) the costs of power (the costs to A of having to exercise 
power over B);
(5) the amount of power (the extent to which A is able to get 
B to do something that B would not otherwise have done);
(6) the scope of power (the acts with respect to which the 
amount of A's power over B is greater than 0); and
(7) the domain of power (the persons over whom the amount of 
A's power is greater than 0).
The disagreement is over which of these i^s power and what kinds of 
base, means, costs, and particularly compliance the word covers.
The predominant practice since Simon (1953) is to treat the 
effects of power as "power" and to cover by the one word a whole 
family of concepts describing the effects of all the human causes of 
human conduct. Force, power, influence, authority, and manipulation 
all have a strong family resemblance to each other, and Dahl (1957),
- 6 -
March (1955), Nagel (1975) and Simon (1953) have all treated them as 
one unitary process. French and Raven (1959) pointed out important 
ways in which the dynamics of different kinds of "power" differ and 
March (1966) has shown compellingly that treating them all as one 
unitary process leads only to a dead end. But the causal analysis 
of power has been unable to shake the tradition that treats it as 
one process.
In the present paper, what we have to say about potential power 
is about power in the sense of unwilling compliance, compliance 
caused by the promise of (external) reward or the threat of 
(external) penalty. We do not believe that power can be treated as 
one unitary process, and arguments about "potential" power do not 
apply to other kinds of power.
The laws of force, for example, differ in a fundamental way 
from the laws governing power. In using force, A does not require B 
to choose between compliance or noncompliance. A kills B, imprisons
B, drags B, wrestles B to the ground, but does not require a choice 
by B. No one asked, told, expected, or in any other way gave B an 
opportunity to do otherwise. Threat of force requires a choice, but 
threat of force is a different process (cf. Goode, 1972). A threat 
may be futile if B has decided to die for a cause and may not 
accomplish its purpose. Actual force will accomplish its purpose 
whether B chooses to comply or not. It simply removes B as a factor 
opposed to A's wishes, as a chess player takes a pawn from the 
board. It is therefore worth distinguishing those rules of
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strategy that depend on psychology, where power is essential, from 
those that depend only on outmaneuvering or overcoming opposite 
forces, where giving no choice is the whole point. These 
differences make it meaningless to talk about potential force except 
as threat of force.
Like force, manipulation does not require that B choose between 
complying or not complying with the wishes of A. A may control B by 
controlling the information at B's disposal or by preventing certain 
choices from being open to B. In some sense, B may be said to make 
choices (hence the difference from force), but A is not requiring B 
to choose between compliance and noncompliance. He is controlling 
the conditions that govern how B analyzes the choice to be made. 
While manipulation depends on the control of resources, its analysis 
has little use for a concept of potential power; it is only 
manipulation in use that matters.
Power, influence, and authority all involve a choice by B 
between compliance or noncompliance. But in the case of power, B is 
induced to do X by a promise of reward for compliance or coerced to 
do X by threat of a penalty for noncompliance. Both rewards and 
penalties are external to the actor. They make no internal change, 
no change in the actor's state of mind; B does not change his views 
privately, even if he conforms publicly (cf. Festinger, 1953). 
Influence, on the other hand, persuades B that X is right according 
to B's own interests, hence B complies privately as well as 
publicly. Compliance is willing in the case of influence, unwilling
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in the case of power. If compliance were not observable to A, B 
would still comply in the case of influence but would not in the 
case of power. (Hence, power is highly dependent on observability 
but influence is not. See French and Raven, 1959; Kelman, 1958.) 
Authority differs from both: Following Barnard (1938), we take 
authority to refer to a claim by A, accepted by B, that A has a 
legitimate right to expect compliance by B, independently of B's own 
preferences. It differs from influence because B does not, or at 
least is not supposed to, examine his own preferences. Whether B 
likes or does not like X is not relevant. It differs from power in 
that B is expected to, and if he accepts A's authority does, comply 
because it is right, not because it is expedient. Weber (19^7) 
pointed out that some people obey authority because it is right but 
some because it is expedient. For the latter, that others accept 
A's legitimacy means that A is capable of assembling resources 
sufficient to exercise (pure) power over B. Any concrete authority 
structure, therefore, involves both authority and power. But 
concrete sturctures are one thing, analytic concepts of authority 
another. For analytic purposes it is important to distinguish power 
from authority. If B accepts A's legitimate authority, then B 
complies with A's commands whether compliance is observable to A or 
not. Furthermore, the power that legitimate authority makes 
possible has different effects because it is legitimate. Power 
exercised outside the scope of legitimate authority creates 
resistance, but power exercised inside the scope of legitimate
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authority does not (cf. Michener and Burt, 1975).
The arguments we make in defense of "potential power" apply 
well to power in the sense of unwilling compliance produced by the 
promise of reward or the threat of penalty. The promise or threat 
of what A could do, i_f B did not comply and if X mattered to A, 
makes good sense to "power" used in this way. But it does not make 
much sense if one means influence or authority. Thus, careful 
limits must be placed on the scope of the argument.
French and Raven (1959) also distinguish reward from 
punishment, hence inducement from coercion. And the arguments for 
doing so are as strong as the argument for distinguishing power from 
influence. It may seem arbitrary that we do not follow them here. 
There are important differences in the effects of rewards, as 
distinct from penalties, on B's resistance to A's power. 
Nevertheless, they are so indissolubly connected that it is even 
more arbitrary to treat them as different processes. A reward 
foregone is a penalty and a penalty foregone is a reward. Hence, 
withholding a reward is equivalent to imposing a penalty and 
withholding a penalty is equivalent to giving a reward. In order to 
distinguish the two, one would have to be able to separate giving 
something from withholding something. This might be possible in 
principle, but not in the case of power. Power depends on the 
contingency of sanctions, i.e., A must be able to give or withhold 
something, depending on whether B does or does not comply. One 
cannot have one without the other.
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By the amount of A's power over B, therefore, we refer to the 
extent to which A is able to get B to do something that B is 
unwilling to do. The means of power refer to (1) giving or 
promising to give rewards; (2) imposing or threatening to impose 
penalties; (3) withholding or threatening to withhold rewards; or
(4) withholding or promising to withhold penalties. The strength of 
A's power refers to the utility (i.e., the subjective value) of the 
penalties threatened. The costs refer to the depletion of A's 
resources by giving rewards or imposing penalties together with the 
prospects of future costs due to increasing or decreasing 
unwillingness of B to do X (penalties being more costly than 
rewards). The bases of A's power over B can be any resources 
instrumental to the goals of B if and only if their transfer can be 
made contingent on compliance by B. The scope of A's power covers 
all acts with respect to which the amount of A's power over B is 
greater than 0; the domain, all the persons over whom the amount of 
A's power is greater than 0.
The difficulties of "power" arise from confusing different 
processes. Those of "potential" arise from the proliferation of 
referents produced by a deeper analysis of the causes of compliance. 
(See especially Gamson, 1968; Harsanyi, 1962; Wrong, 196 8.) It is 
important to distinguish the objective from the subjective, the 
total from the usable, the point from the schedule senses of 
"potential power" but impossible to insist on any one of them as the 
only meaning of "potential." The impoverished vocabulary of power
- 1 2 -
has stretched its only available term over too many ideas, all of 
which are necessary to an adequate theory of power. The present 
paper, however, needs only two of them: (1) the objective base of 
A's power, i.e., given that B values G, the stock of resources 
possessed by A that an outside observer believes is instrumental to 
G; and (2) perceived potential power, i.e., the subjective beliefs 
of B about what A could do if it were important enough to A.
II. Is the Base of Power Inert?
A. Hypotheses
In a famous dialogue between actual and potential power, Dahl 
argued that what we want to know is the extent to which A gets B to 
do something B would not otherwise do. Knowing the stock of 
resources possessed by A is not sufficient because individuals 
differ in the intensity of their preferences for X and A's use of 
these resources varies with the intensity of his preferences. A may 
be rich but not use his wealth; influential but not use his 
influence. His interests may lie elsewhere. (Dahl, 1961, ch. 24.)
This argument assumes that the base of A's power is inert. It 
has an effect on B if and only if used. Dahl has never actually 
constructed a theory of power, but implicit in his argument is a 
model of power-dependence relations which, even if it employs the 
base of A's power in an essential way, attributes all of the effect 
of the base to one intervening variable, the actual use of A's 
resources (hence, to "actual" power).
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There are alternative formulations, of course, that hold that 
the base itself is active. Friedrich (1963) and others (e.g. Nagel, 
1968; 1975; Oppenheim, 1958; Wrong, 1968) have argued that through 
the "law of anticipated reactions" A has an effect on B that does 
not depend on A's overt exercise of power. B governs his conduct by 
anticipating in advance what A would do if B did not comply with the 
(known) wishes of A.
There are a number of ways in which B might know A's 
preferences and the probability that A will reward compliance and 
penalize noncompliance. These include: (1) past experience with A;
(2) past experience with others like A; (3) past experience of 
others with A reported ^o B; or (4) cultural tradition passed on to 
B about people like A. It is the fertile number of these 
possibilities that opens up the question whether A must promise 
rewards and/or threaten penalties each time a choice in A's 
interests faces B. In a world with a past and a future there is a 
strong possibility that B can anticipate what A will do without A 
having to tell B either what he wants or what he will do if B does 
not comply. B is able to rehearse in advance what A will do if B 
does X and what A will do if B does not do X. Net of the overt 
power of A over B there is therefore an effect, through B's 
anticipations of A's preferences and sanctions, which is covert.
But by itself this is not the strongest possible case for 
potential power. The argument depends on B knowing what A would do.
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Potential power is a matter of knowing what A could do. B might 
well know A's preferences without knowing the probability that A 
will reward compliance and/or penalize noncompliance. B might not 
even know A's preferences. There are still at least two strong 
arguments for supposing that the base of A's power will have a 
covert effect on B, an effect that does not depend on A expressing 
preferences, promising rewards, or threatening penalties.
One of these arguments, deriving from the theory of subjective 
expected utility, has to do with how B subjectively infers the 
probabilities that A rewards compliance and penalizes noncompliance 
when B knows A's preferences. In the face of uncertainty about his 
risks, the guesses that B hazards obey certain heuristic principles 
(reviewed by Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) the most important of which 
for present purposes are representativeness, i.e., conjectures based 
on the kind of person A is (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973)» and 
causality, i.e., conjectures about the causes and conditions of A's 
behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). A quite reasonable 
hypothesis based on these principles is that B will infer that A 
will sanction noncompliance with a probability proportional to the 
intensity of A's preferences. Common-sense assumptions about the 
conditions of power should also make this probability directly 
proportional to A's potential power.
If B does not know even A's preferences, the principles of 
representativeness and causality still permit plausible inferences 
about the behavior to be anticipated from A. It is likely that well
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before Marx the Western man-in-the-street already believed in 
common-sense causal schemas in which objective interests were 
determinants of action. Whether justified by fact or not, such 
common-sense causal schemas permit inferences about A's preferences 
providing one knows something about A's objective interests. 
("Objective" in this case refers not to an outside observer's 
analysis but to B's knowledge of A's situation.) From such 
knowledge, calculations (however limited by bounded rationality) are 
possible of A's prospective gains and losses. It is reasonable to 
conjecture that, in B's eyes, the intensity of A's preferences is 
proportional to these gains and losses. Once given, such inferences 
can be made the basis, in turn, for estimates about the 
probabilities of rewards and penalties.
The other of these arguments, deriving from the theory of 
decisions under uncertainty, makes even stronger assumptions with 
even weaker givens. B will often be unable to calculate the inten­
sity, or even direction, of A's preferences and therefore have no 
idea of the rewards or penalties for doing X. A graduate student, 
for example, will often have a good deal at stake in a graduate 
course without, in the early stages of the course, knowing what the 
professor thinks, in particular instances, are the "right" ideas to 
have. If it is possible to do nothing, 0 is the safe response: It 
is the behavior that minimizes the likelihood of the worst that A 
could do if what you did did not satisfy A. Under conditions of 
uncertainty, B faces three possible gambles: Without knowing
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whether A prefers X or Y (1) do X, with a possible reward of R if A 
prefers X but a possible loss of P if A prefers Y; (2) do Y with a 
possible reward of R if A prefers Y but a possible loss of P if A 
prefers X; (3) do nothing, with a certain loss of R but certainly 
foregoing P. As P increases (whatever R), uncertainty should drive 
B in the direction of minimizing the probability that the worst 
might happen to him by increasing the rate of nondecision. Because 
interaction is repeated, not a static event, there is the added 
possibility of later complying with A's preferences if they reveal 
themselves.
The law of anticipated reactions has been tested (and 
supported) by a separate experiment reported elsewhere (Ford, 1981). 
The present paper is concerned less with what A would do than with 
what A could do: Even if the base of A's power is not inert when B 
knows what A would do if B did X, it is possible that it is inert 
when B is uncertain about A's preferences and/or sanctions. The 
arguments of the previous three paragraphs, however, suggest ways in 
which what A could do has an effect, independently of the overt 
exercise of power, that does not depend on B's knowledge of A's 
preferences or the probability of reward for compliance or penalty 
for noncompliance. They lead first of all to the hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 1. (Uncertain Sanctions) If B knows A's 
preferences but not the probability of reward for compliance or 
penalty for noncompliance, compliance with A's preferences is 
directly proportional to B's perception of A's potential power.
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This follows from the hypothesis that B infers A's reactions in part 
from A's potential power; and if not, it is still the minimax 
solution to uncertainty. The same arguments lead to a second 
hypothesis, that if it is possible to do nothing,
Hypothesis 2. (Uncertain Preferences) If B does not know A's 
preferences, the rate of nondecisions is directly proportional 
to B's perception of A's potential power.
This follows from the hypothesis that B infers A's reactions in part
from his interests, if these correlate with A's power (as is argued
by Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963; 1970; and by Schattschneider,
I960); and if not, that under uncertainty nondecisions minimize the
probability that the worst can happen to B.
B. The methodological problems of the study of nondecisions.
A test of hypothesis 2 depends on observing nondecisions. 
Unfortunately, nondecisions present serious methodological problems, 
(cf. Frey, 1971; Merleman, 1968; Polsby, 1980, ch. 11; Wolfinger, 
1971.) These arise from the fact that there are an infinite number 
of things a group does not decide, only some of which can be called 
"issues" in the sense that some member of the group prefers an 
alternative that is not on its agenda. Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 
1963; 1970) who founded the subject, provided no generally accepted 
criterion of issueness, i.e., no acceptable line of demarcation 
between suppressed issues and matters of no interest to anyone. 
Crenson (1971) and Smith ( 1979) overcame this objection by a
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comparative method. This method depended on the argument that, 
comparing otherwise similar groups, a variable X can be said to 
cause a nondecision if and only if issue Y is present when X is 
absent. But the conditions required by such a comparison are 
difficult to satisfy: Crenson was able to argue that pollution 
levels were known in the 51 communities he studied because the 
government publishes such data; Smith was able to argue that absence 
of a referendum on fluoridation in New York was meaningful because 
the state left fluoridation to local option. But not all issues 
come this nicely framed. Even when they do, it is difficult to 
achieve the required level of control over confounding factors. 
Polsby (1980, ch. 11), for example, objects to Crenson's conclusion 
(that concentration of industrial ownership makes debate over air 
pollution less likely) because Crenson does not control for the 
rival hypothesis that it makes jobs more important than pollution to 
workers, who therefore have no interest in air pollution ordinances. 
(That this may also be a nondecision argument does not make the 
problem of method less serious.)
The required level of measurement and control is more readily 
achieved by experimental methods: We will create an issue of 
equality of opportunity in a laboratory and observe whether the 
issue does nor does not emerge in control groups. If it does, we 
will argue that the same issue is also present in treatment groups 
of the experiment even if it does not emerge into the open in them.
This method is, of course, peculiarly suited to uncertainty
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about preferences and is unnecessary for uncertainty about 
sanctions. Uncertain sanctions, because preferences are known, do 
not require nondecision. Nevertheless, we will use 
nondecisionmaking to test hypothesis 1 also. It does not require 
nondecisions but equally it does not require decisions. Compliance 
can be defined in a way that encompasses both. If A prefers that B 
not raise an issue and B does not raise an issue, we assume that B 
is complying with the wishes of A providing in matched control 
groups B does raise the issue created by the experiment.
C. The methodological problems of reciprocal power.
As outcomes of collective decision, nondecisions occur in 
settings in which many mutually dependent actors are in some kind of 
conflict over a policy outcome. (Call this n־person reciprocal 
power over policy outcomes.) The experiment in which we create an 
issue, although it involves 5־person groups, creates 2-person 
unilateral power over individual decisions to raise an issue or not. 
The reason for this is that hypotheses about anticipated reactions, 
inferred reactions, and aversion to uncertainty are symmetrical in 
any natural setting because in any natural setting B always has some 
power, if for no other reason than A's dependence on B's compliance. 
Power is not only relational, it is reciprocal (which is not the 
same thing). (Cf. Simmel, 1950, 181-186.) To focus only on what B 
anticipates of A is arbitrary: A anticipates B just as B 
anticipates A. (Cf. Dahl, 1957; March, 1955; Nagel, 1975; Simon,
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1953•) A takes into account both how likely power is to succeed and 
the prospects of retaliation. It is therefore difficult in natural 
settings to disentangle causes. Is a president powerful whose veto 
has never been overridden by Congress? Or is he merely good at 
counting votes? (See Simon, 1953•)
Simon (1953) offered.the possibility that one of A or B 
mistakenly infers reactions as a solution to the problems created by 
the reciprocity of power. This would permit one to decide who was 
changing whom. But the required level of isolation of A as the 
single cause of B's behavior is more easily achieved by creating 
unilateral dependence by experiment. While no such state exists in 
nature, objections to the resulting artificiality are like objecting 
to physical experiments because vacua or frictionless machines do 
not occur in nature. One cannot create a setting in which B has no 
resources even by experiment, but one can use confederates in A's 
role who do not care if B does or does not comply, hence do not 
depend on B at all. It is only by experiment that one can create an 
idealization like unilateral dependence but the simplification used 
by the experiment to realize the conditions of this idealization are 
the virtue, not the defect of the method.
We do not mean to argue that a rigorous solution to the problem 
of internal validity has no costs for external validity or that one 
can, would, or should, generalize from the results of the present 
experiment directly to n-person reciprocal power over policy 
outcomes. The more general question (of the relation of an
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experimental test to "real" worlds) takes up more space than we can 
give it here, but the specific question of prospects for 
generalizing to n-person reciprocal power over policy outcomes will 
be taken up at the end of part (On the more general question,
see Zelditch, 1969; also, Zelditch, et al, 1983, 19-21.)
D. Experimental Procedures.
Subjects (S's) in this investigation were sixty-one male 
undergraduates who served as paid volunteers. The participants were 
told that they could earn an average of $12 for their participation 
in a study of social communication processes, and were in fact all 
paid $12. The setting consisted of five soundproofed rooms each 
equipped with a desk, chair, television monitor, signaling device, 
and a variety of message forms. When S's arrived at the laboratory, 
they each drew a colored chip which corresponded to one of the five 
rooms. The colors of the chips (red, yellow, blue, orange or green) 
were used to identify S's throughout the study. The orange chip was 
never included; "orange" was a confederate of the experimenter.
S's received video-taped instructions which indicated that they 
were members of a five-person team which would work a series of ten 
problems. The study was presented as an investigation of the 
process of communication and problem-solving in an organization 
whose members could not engage in face-to-face communication. It 
was explained that cooperation and accurate transmission of messages 
were necessary for any member of the group to correctly solve the
problems. As a consequence, what the team earned for solving a 
problem correctly was awarded to the team as a team. Each member of 
the group was required to submit an answer to the problem and the 
group was given 60 cents for each correct answer on each trial of 
the experiment. Group earnings were to be divided equally among 
group members at the end of the study in the control conditions, but 
were to be allocated by orange, the center of the communication 
network, in the two treatment conditions.
The task required the team members to construct a series of 
multi-arc graphs (cf. Faucheux and Mackenzie, 1966; Mackenzie,
1976). At the start of each trial each member of the group had 
information which corresponded to two lines of the solution graph. 
Successful completion of the task required that each member collect 
the information held by the other four members, assemble that 
information and send the solution to the experimenter's "office."
All communication was restricted to written memoranda which were 
picked up and delivered by experimental assistants. A trial of the 
experiment was completed when the office had received an answer from 
all five members of the group.
Each group was assigned to a Bavelas (1950) "wheel" structure 
which consisted of a central position (always held by orange) linked 
to four peripheral positions by a symmetric channel of communication 
to each. All other channels of communication were closed. S's were 
instructed that the structure, which was the subject of the study, 
had been randomly chosen. It was never presented graphically but
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was described in terms of a list of open and closed channels. S's 
were reminded that they had been randomly assigned to their 
positions in this structure and were alike in sex, age, and 
schooling.
S's were instructed that if for any reason they wished to 
change the structure they could rent additional channels of 
communication at a small cost (10 cents per channel per problem) but 
that all members had to share the costs of rented channels. It was 
therefore necessary for a majority of the group to agree before 
channels could be opened (or, after being opened, closed). The 
procedure for renting channels involved two stages: First, a member 
had to propose a specific agenda, i.e., a list of channels to be 
opened or closed. To come to a vote, this proposal had to be 
endorsed by one other member. If someone else seconded the 
proposal, E's staff would then go through the election procedure, 
with the proposed channels as the agenda. If the proposal won, the 
channels were opened and rental charges deducted from team earnings 
for the remaining trials of the experiment or until a new election 
was held. But in fact the experiment never got to that stage. If S 
submitted an agenda for election to any other member of his team the 
experiment stopped for that S, who was taken to a second room, 
interviewed and debriefed. Because all messages were pre-programmed 
by E, each S was in fact independent of any other S, hence all other 
S's could continue without any change in the experimental conditions 
until they either proposed a change or completed ten problems.
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After one practice problem which assured that S's understood 
the procedures for completing the problems, and a short 
questionnaire, the host E appeared on S's television monitor and 
reported that the team had worked accurately but a little too 
slowly. In order to encourage faster performance, he announced a 
bonus of $3*00 for each problem to the person who first submitted 
the correct solution. S's were instructed that this bonus could not 
be divided.
The effect of this bonus was to give orange a significantly 
larger reward than any other member of the team. Because of 
orange's central position, all information had first to pass through 
him before any other member could solve the problem. Because S's 
had been led to believe that they all had equal abilities and could 
earn equal amounts the effect of the bonus was to create a 
significant inequity, as well as competitive pressures in what was 
otherwise a cooperative group task.
This inequity, together with the expected gain that might be 
earned if only S had an opportunity to win the bonus, created a 
strong pressure to change the structure of the group. If, for 
example, S changed to an all-all structure, which is the structure 
that would have done the most to equalize opportunity, it would have 
cost each S $1.08 if the change occurred at the end of the first 
trial, but the expected value of the change would be a total of 
$10.32 compared to $6.00 if S remained in the wheel, a gain of $4.32 
after the cost of the change was paid. This gain changed, of
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course, at each trial of the experiment -- the cost of the change 
decreasing by 12 cents per trial, the gain decreasing by 60 cents 
per trial, hence the net gain decreasing by 48 cents per trial. But 
even at the end of trial 9 there was still a gain (of 48 cents) from 
a change and, much more important, the equity pressure increased at 
each trial. The inequity, in fact, increased at the rate of 60 
cents per trial. (That is, the difference between what one would 
have earned had opportunity been equal and what S did earn increased 
at 60 cents a trial, coming to $6.00 by the end of the experiment.) 
Worse, the difference between what orange earned and each other S 
earned increased at a rate of $3«00 per trial, coming to $30.00 by 
the tenth trial.
Countering this pressure to change, in two treatment conditions 
orange, the center of the wheel, had the right to allocate the team 
earnings as he saw fit at the end of the experiment. The resources 
available to orange (a total of $3 0 .0 0) constituted his "potential 
power." If orange penalized S, S stood to lose at most $6.00 (10 x 
60 cents per trial).
In one of these two treatments, S's were told that data from 
previous experiments showed that once in the orange position, the S 
in that position liked it and approved of the communication system 
so much that he almost never wanted to change it. In the other, S's 
were told that "so far we have found some people who like the 
position, because of the added responsibility and the more 
interesting task, but others who feel 'on the spot' and are very
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uncomfortable with the position because they feel it unfair that 
they have the orange position when everyone is equal to start with."
"Hence," the S's were told, "we have no idea just how often people 
feel one way or the other." The first condition is called the 
knowledge condition, the second the ignorance condition. In the 
baseline, or control, condition the team earnings were to be divided 
equally; nothing at all was said about orange's preferences.
Given these task and interaction conditions, the operational 
definition of (objective) potential power is the stock of resources 
at the disposal of orange (the team earnings). But perceived 
potential power is an unmeasured variable, which perhaps calls for 
some comment. It functions, in this experiment, like subjective- 
expected-utilities in SEU power experiments. The work of Tedeschi, 
et al, 1973, is typical of SEU practice: the predictions made are 
in fact only ordinal, hence require no more than the assumptions 
that people prefer more money to less (however different the value 
of money from one individual to another) and that the subjective 
probability of an event is a monotonically increasing function of 
its objective probability (typically untrue at the extremes but more 
or less true in the mid-range). Because S's are randomly allocated 
to treatments, the subjective values (of both money and probability) 
ought to distribute themselves around the objective values in 
roughly the same manner in all conditions. For ordinal predictions 
one therefore does not need the exact values, hence the objective 
value (in this case of money) is taken as a reasonable proxy for the
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subjective value. Here we apply the same logic to perceived poten­
tial power. As for issueness, equality of opportunity is taken to 
be an issue in the group if and only if in the control group the 
members change its structure, and a proposal to change the group's 
structure, called a change-response (C-response) operationally de­
fines the possible outcomes (positive and negative) of a metadeci­
sion. The results of the experiment are therefore inferred from the 
(trial by trial) distribution of C-responses, and the hypotheses we 
propose to test are that S's in both the knowledge and ignorance 
conditions will on the average complete more trials of the experi­
ment than S's in the baseline condition. These hypotheses should be 
thought of as two independent tests, not as an ordering of the three 
conditions.
E. Inclusion of data and validity of manipulations.
There was a high rate of loss of S's in this experiment, due to 
the large number of conditions an S had to satisfy in order to test 
the hypotheses. Of a total of 84 S's run, 24 were excluded from the 
data, slightly over a fifth of all S's. Six S's were suspicious of 
the deception in the experiment; six were terminated for reasons 
other than proposing a change or completing 10 trials; and twelve 
violated one or more of the task or rental procedures. The 
"terminations" occurred either because S's delayed or because they 
sent false information two times during the experiment -- tactics 
exploiting the power of the peripheral position to prevent orange
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from winning, but neither nondecisions nor agendas for decisions.
The excluded S's were rather evenly divided among conditions: nine 
were lost in the baseline, seven in the knowledge, and eight in the 
ignorance conditions.
An important condition that the experimental treatments must 
satisfy if the conclusions are to be interpretable is that S's 
should believe that the bonus is inequitable to the same degree in 
all three conditions. We therefore checked post-session evaluations 
of the bonus and the wheel in several different ways. S's were 
asked how appropriate the bonus was, how justified the amount of the 
bonus was, and whether it was desirable to change the communication 
network in future studies. Finally, it was expected that private 
conformity would differ from public conformity, if it were power 
rather than influence at work in the experiment, and we therefore 
also asked if S had considered renting additional channels of 
communication during the study. The results of the first three 
questions are shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Perceptions of inequity by condition
Mean Responses*
Post--session questionnaire item
Base­
line
Know­
ledge
Ignor­
ance
"How
"How
"How
appropriate ... is... a bonus?" 
do you feel about the amount...?" 
desirable... is (a) change...?"
4.84 
3.79 
1.95
4.50
3.25
2.45
4.57 
3.67 
2. 19
5‘ All responses were on a 5-point scale on which "1" was "high" 
and "5" was "low." There were no significant differences between 
the baseline and treatment responses for any item in any condition 
(using two-tailed t-tests).
No significant differences were found in subject attitudes towards 
the inequity of the bonus. Nor were there differences in private 
noncompliance; 95% of the S's considered renting in the baseline, 
85% in the knowledge condition, and 81% in the ignorance condition 
(n . s . ) .
F . Results.
Left to themselves, S's in the baseline condition had almost 
all proposed an agenda for change by the third trial of the 
experiment. Forty-five percent had proposed a change by the end of 
the first trial; 70 per cent had proposed a change by the end of the 
second; 80 per cent had proposed a change by the end of the third. 
Only one S out of 20, completed all ten baseline trials. In the 
knowledge condition, on the other hand, less than half proposed a 
change by the end of the third trial and 30 per cent completed all
Iten trials. In the ignorance condition too, less than half proposed 
a change by the end of the third trial and even more, 48 per cent, 
completed all ten trials. (See Table 2.)
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TABLE 2. Percent of S's surviving at the end of each trial 
by condition.
Condition N
Trial
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Baseline 20 55 30 20 10 10 10 10 5 5 5
Knowledge 20 80 70 55 35 30 30 30 30 30 30
Ignorance 21 86 76 57 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
The best representation of the experiment's data is the per
cent of S 1s surviving at each trial, called the "survival" curve
(Peto and Peto, 1972; Peto, et al, 1977) (See Figure 1. ) The
entire curve is used, and is the only sound basis for interpreting 
the experiment, because both the median and the mean are known to 
misrepresent the results. The observed number of proposed changes 
sometimes adequately represents the process. But even that is not 
always an adequate summary statistic because two curves can differ 
significantly, if change is later in one than the other, and still 
have the same probability of survival at trial 10.
The significance of the differences between two survival curves 
can be assessed by the logrank test (Peto and Peto, 1972; Peto, et
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al, 1977), the most powerful nonparametric test available for this 
kind of data. The essential idea of this test is that if the 
proportion terminating the experiment at each trial differs by 
condition, then the proportion "exposed to risk" on the next trial 
also differs by condition.
TABLE 3• Observed number, expected number, and relative rate of 
change-responses by condition.
Condition N
Observed Num­
ber of Change 
Responses (0)
Extent of 
Exposure 
to Risk (E)
Relative 
Rate of 
Change (0/E)
Baseline 20 19 10.33 1.90
Knowledge 20 11 17.73 0.61
Ignorance 21 14 15.89 0.88
All 61 44 43.95 1.00
Hence, the expected values against which to assess observed
change-responses change at each trial. The test computes these 
shifting expected values (using logs in a way that do not matter 
here) and the differences between observed and expected values are 
distributed approximately as chi square. The "extent of exposure to 
risk" in Table 3 is simply the expected value computed on a trial by 
trial basis as the number of survivors decreases.
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TABLE 4. Logrank comparisons of knowledge and ignorance 
conditions with the baseline rate of change and 
with each other.
Logrank Statistics
Comparisons Event Ratio1* Chi Square Probability
Knowledge/baseline 0.46 4.57 pC .05
Ignorance/baseline 0.32 9.17 p[.001
Ignorance/knowledge 0.70 0.64 n . s .
# The event ratio is the ratio of two relative rates of change. 
Thus: 46% as much change took place in the knowledge as the 
baseline condition; hence, knowledge of the more powerful person's 
preferences prevented or delayed 54% of the change taking place in 
the baseline.
Associated with the logrank test is a summary statistic that 
estimates the magnitude as well as significance of an effect. The 
ratio of the observed to expected value of each condition gives the 
relative rate of change for that condition compared to the average 
for all S's. (See column 3 of Table 3•) Comparison of the relative 
rates of change between a treatment condition and the baseline gives 
a good idea of the relative rate of change in the treatment condi­
tion. This figure, called the event ratio, is shown in column 1 of 
Table 4.
The comparison of the relative rates of change of the knowledge 
and baseline conditions shows 46% as much change in the knowledge 
condition. Put slightly differently, knowledge of A's preferences 
prevented or delayed 54% of the change taking place in the baseline
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(100% - 46%). The ignorance condition had about a third of the 
amount of change found in the baseline. Thus, ignorance prevented 
or delayed about two-thirds of the change taking place in the 
baseline.
Table 4 shows the significance of these differences in columns 
2 and 3• There was significantly less change in both the knowledge 
and ignorance conditions than in the baseline. Knowledge, even 
without a reasonable objective basis for estimating the likelihood 
that orange will actually sanction S, substantially reduces 
proposals to change the wheel to some other structure. Given 
sufficient potential power in the hands of orange, subjects choose 
not to act even when they do not know orange's preferences.
The somewhat greater effect of the ignorance condition compared 
to knowledge, on the other hand, could well have occurred purely by 
chance. That ignorance produced 30 per cent less change than 
knowledge of orange's preferences is not a significant difference.
G. Further Evidence on the Inferences S makes from the 
Setting.
The results reported in section F support the view either that 
S's used orange's perceived power and interests to infer orange's 
preferences and the prospect of sanctions or, possibly, that they 
are averse to unknown risks implied in orange's power. Further 
evidence on what S's at least say they are doing in such settings is 
provided by a survey method in which S's were presented with
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vignettes of situations simulating the experiment just described 
which were compared with vignettes of situations stripped of any 
cues from which inferences about A's preferences could be made. S's 
were asked to predict how they and others would behave in these 
situations and to say why. (See Ford and Zelditch, 1983-) All 
conditions were presented to all S's.
Two vignettes presented to S's in this survey are relevant 
here. One vignette described essentially the procedures of the 
previous experiment, although more briefly, and then presented 
problem 1 below. (The per cent of S's choosing each alternative is 
shown in parentheses.)
Problem 1 (N = 8 3 ): You have no way of knowing whether 
the person allocating shares of the team earnings likes that 
position, o_r would want to stay in it, and, therefore, no way 
of knowing whether that person will use the power to withhold 
team earnings against anyone who attempts to change the set-up. 
Here are the two possible choices you could make:
A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $6.00 
(your share of group pay). (42%)
B. Change things for an unknown probability of earning 
$12.00 and an unknown probability of gaining nothing. 
(58%)
About 6% more S's believe they would make a C-response than actually 
do in the experiment -- a very modest autonomy effect. Those who do 
not are more likely to say that they do nothing because they are 
certain of sanctions (34%) than say that they are uncertain but 
taking no chances (6%).
A second vignette described a group interview (of five candi-
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dates) for admission to a graduate school that S was told to regard 
as his most preferred alternative. S was told that in the course of 
the interview,
Problem 2 (N = 8 3): "...the interviewer asks a very 
specific question about how you would deal with an issue of 
great controversy in your field. You are familiar with both 
sides of the issue...but lean toward a particular point of 
view. You know that this question is being asked as some sort 
of test or selection mechanism. Naturally you want to appear 
to your best advantage... so you figure that you should answer 
the question first. This, however, is a gamble, as you have 
no idea how the interviewer feels about this particular topic 
and you feel that you have a better chance of being selected if 
your views do coincide. There is a traditional way of dealing 
with the problem, but you feel that your view, though less 
traditional, is better and is in fact the method of the 
f uture...".
What would you do?
A. ...propose the traditional point of view. (0%)
B. ...propose my point of view. (70%)
C. ...I would not be the first to speak. (30%)
What do you think others would do...?
A. Propose the traditional view. (1%)
B. Propose their own view. (46%)
C. Not be the first to speak. (53%)
Here, S's behavior shows a strong autonomy effect, but predictions 
about the behavior of others shows a slightly stronger aversion to 
unknown risks than problem 1 and also than the results described in 
section F. S's explained their own responses by needs for autonomy 
but explained others' behavior by strong needs for playing it safe.
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H. Limits to the generality of the experiment's findings.
Potential power is a concept most often employed in 
macro-sociological arguments. Our experiment demonstrates its 
effects in interpersonal dyads. Can its results be extended to 
power in "macro" settings?
If by "macro" one means compositional effects (aggregating the 
behavior of A and B and generalizing it to n-person reciprocal 
power), it provides no evidence of the behavior of the composition 
but it does provide an essential component of it and in that sense 
is applicable in a macro argument. If by "macro" one means an 
increase in scale (for example a larger number of B's), there will 
certainly be a size effect but it is more likely to be on the 
magnitude than the form of the effect found in the experiment. But 
if by "macro" one means relations between collective as opposed to 
individual actors, the results may be inapplicable.
The question in extending our results to collectives turns 
essentially on whether or not collectives can be treated as unitary 
actors. The conception underlying the experiment is decision- 
theoretic: Actors are assumed to have goals and values, to assess 
outcomes in terms of these goals and values, to assess the 
probabilities that various alternative actions produce these 
outcomes. It is assumed that actors are pushed towards an action by 
the positive values and away from it by the negative values of its 
outcomes weighted by their probabilities (hence towards any action 
by a combination of its positive values and the negative values of
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its alternatives). They are assumed to "maximize" the value of an 
alternative, i.e., to make the choice that leads to the most 
preferred outcome. It is this conception that leads to the idea 
that, under uncertainty, actors minimize the likelihood of worst 
possible outcome. These ideas can be extended from individual to 
collective actors providing one assumes collective actors are 
unitary or, at least, that their choices are based on a consistent 
preference function. This is, of course, the predominant tradition 
in organizational analysis and accounts for the ease with which 
organizational analysis extended Emerson's dyadic theory of 
interpersonal power to explain intra-organizational and even inter- 
organizational power. (Cf. Hickson, et al, 1971; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967.) Provan, et al, 1980, for example, 
in a study of inter-organizational power-dependence relations finds 
collectives that perceive potential power and obey the law of 
anticipated reactions. And the whole "resources mobilization" 
approach to collective action is based on the same foundations 
(hence is consistent with our results). (Cf. Gamson, 1975; 
Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977.)
But a strong argument can be made that collectives are not 
unitary actors, they are coalitions of diverse interests (cf. 
Allison, 1971; Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1962; Simon, 1964). 
Parties to these coalitions are in conflict over goals and means. 
Hence, they do not have consistent (i.e., transitive) preference 
functions and they are only "loosely coupled": (Weick, 1976) -- they
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do not have the imperatively controlled unity of will that 
bureaucratic theory attributes to them. If they do not, then they 
may or may not behave like our individual S's but even if they do 
our experiment is not adequate to prove it.
The whole argument is controversial and no definitive 
conclusion is possible at this time about whether it should displace 
the predominant tradition. If we simply take the view that some 
collectives are and some are not unitary actors, however, we must 
draw limits to the generality of our results at the point at which 
collectives are not unitary. It is, of course, possible that, for 
some other reason, organizations that are not unitary also nondecide 
under uncertainty. But this cannot easily be explained by any 
straightforward extension of our results.
III. What Does Potential Power Imply?
A. Problem.
Two of the more serious objections to a theory of potential 
power are that most such theories treat power as a unidimensional 
attribute, which is contrary to fact, or else imply that Santa Claus 
is powerful if B believes in him, an undesirable paradox. Both 
questions derive, in different ways, from a more basic question 
about the structure that lies behind acts of observable compliance. 
In part iii we study in some detail the implications of a concept of 
potential power to see if these objections are justified and what 
sense it makes to speak of something called a "power structure."
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B. Does it make sense to talk about "power structures"?
A fundamental objective of any theory of power is to predict 
and explain unwilling compliance by B with the wishes of A. In 
accomplishing this objective, resources possessed by A play an 
essential role. A number of attempts to describe a "power 
structure" from this point of view have been made (Lynd and Lynd, 
1937; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956). All of these treat power as if it 
were an attribute of A, i.e., as if one could meaningfully speak of 
how much power an actor A has, without reference to B. If power 
capacities are a unidimensional attribute it is natural to ask "Who 
has the power?" in a given community. The answer typically takes 
the form of a rank order of either individuals or groups that is 
referred to as "the power structure." "Power structures" in this 
sense have four properties: They are (relatively) permanent; their 
underlying basis is relatively general (i.e., does not vary from 
issue to issue); they are completely connected -- that is, for every 
pair of elements in the order it is possible to decide whether A is 
more powerful than B, B is more powerful than A, or the two are 
equally powerful; and the order is transitive -- if A is more 
powerful than B and B is more powerful than C, then A is more 
powerful than C.
This implication that power is a unidimensional attribute is 
felt to be undesirable because almost everyone else has argued
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(correctly, in our view) that observable power is a multidimensional 
relation. The expression "A is powerful" is as meaningless as "10 
is greater than." The "relation" that is meant is a three-predicate 
relation between A, B, and X. "Power relations" in this sense have 
quite different properties than "power structures": They are 
transient, issue-specific, incompletely connected, and intransitive. 
(See especially Dahl, 1957; 1958; Polsby, 1980.)
The derivation of these four properties depends first of all on 
the relations among the amount, domain, and scope of A's power and 
second of all on the relation between A's and B's utility for X and 
the outcome of contests between them over X.
For Dahl, Polsby, and many others, to talk about a "power 
structure" requires that one be able to compare the amount of power 
of A over B with respect to X to the amount of power of C over D 
with respect to Y. But the elements of a power relation vary inde­
pendently of each other. How does one compare the power of the 
mayor of New York City with the power of the commanding officer of a 
small warship? There is no known transformation that carries the 
multidimensional vector (amount, scope, domain) into an acceptable 
scalar. Therefore, no one has found an acceptable method of com­
paring, for example, the power of the mayor of New York City even 
with his own council, the civil bureaucracy, banking interests, cor­
porate interests, union, professional and other interests in the 
city. The only known solution to the problem of power-comparability 
is to hold constant two of the three dimensions while comparing the
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third.
The explanation of observed compliance depends not only on the 
power of A over B but also on the utility of the act X to both A and
B. The greater the disutility of X to B, the greater B's 
resistance. On the other hand, the greater the utility of B's 
compliance to A, the greater the likelihood that A exercises power 
over B and the more resources A is likely to commit to his purpose. 
But goal-comparability (i.e., A and B's utilities for various acts 
directed at various ends) is as difficult as power-comparability.
The utility of X varies from B to D and therefore the conditions 
creating particular acts of compliance are incomparable from X to Y. 
Utility scales (supposing they exist) provide a common metric for 
comparing acts across actors but this metric does not allow 
comparing the power of A over B with respect to X with the power of 
C over D with respect to Y because it is unique only up to an 
order-preserving transformation. In plainer English, the scales for 
two different individuals will often have different units and 
different origins; hence often cannot be added across individuals. 
The same holds for the utility of X to A: Differences in utility 
between X and Y mean that one cannot infer anything about the future 
prospect of A's power over B from the outcome of any past conflict 
over X. If A won, X may have been more important to A than to B. 
With respect to some other issue, say Y, the outcome could be 
reversed if Y mattered to B more than it did to A. (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; Gamson, 1968; Kornberg and Perry, 1966; Mills, 1956.)
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Such power and goal incomparabilities lead one to see observed 
power in terms of transient acts. The underlying basis of such acts 
is issue-specific. Actors are only partially-ordered: That is, 
comparing two relations (A, B, X) and (C, D, Y), one sometimes 
cannot decide whether A is more powerful than C, C is more powerful 
than A, or that the two are equal. Connected relations, if they 
exist, are sometimes intransitive. That is, that A is more powerful 
than B and B more powerful than C does not imply that A is more 
powerful than C.
But it is not the concept of potential power itself that leads 
the Lynds, Mills, Hunter, and others to treat power as a 
unidimensional attribute and power structures as connected and 
transitive orders. At the level of acts of observable compliance, 
potential power has the same properties as actual power.
Not even the counting of objective, observer-defined, resources 
is unidimensional. There is no known method of defining a common 
metric that permits adding different kinds of resources, no method 
of combining the wealth of the rich, the monopoly of corporations, 
the patronage of parties, the command of armies. Power as a 
unidimensional attribute would make sense if and only if there were 
exactly one resource (say money or ownership of the means of 
production), an absurd limit, or all resources were perfectly 
inter-correlated, an entirely separate (and unwarranted) assumption.
But resources are in any case not objective. A resource is a 
state or object that is instrumental to some actor's goals. It
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gives rise to power if A controls resources on which B depends. The 
amount of A's resources depends both on what A possesses and on how 
badly B wants what A has. Countercultures rob universities of the 
power to control sit-ins by threatening their students with 
expulsion. Total commitment to a cause robs civil governments of 
the power to control terrorism by threats of death. If B has no 
goals, A has no resources; and what resources A has depends on what 
it is that B wants.
The p-centricity of resources (i.e., their dependence on the 
actor) implies first of all that potential power is a relation in 
the same sense as actual power and secondly that the relation is 
multi-dimensional. The amount of A's power over B depends on B, not 
only on A (implying the independence of the domain and amount of 
power). The importance of B's beliefs about what A could do has the 
same implication: A's power depends on B, hence the amount and 
domain of power are separate dimensions. And, although a theory of 
potential power can neglect the intensity of A's preferences (as 
implied by hypothesis 2 in part ii), it still requires the intensity 
of A's preferences to predict actual behavior. It is important to 
keep in mind that in a theory of potential power, potential power is 
only one of the factors that explain behavior. The amount of A's 
power over B, in any observable instance, still depends on X as well 
as on B (implying the independence of the scope and amount of A's 
power).
Nevertheless, it is true that it makes more sense to talk about
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"power structures" in a theory of potential than actual power. This 
is because a theory of potential power, unlike a theory of actual 
power, distinguishes between observable phenomena and its underlying 
structure. A theory of actual power is a theory at one level, acts. 
A theory of potential power works at two levels, acts and relations. 
It is this difference, not the dimensionality of relations, that 
makes it more natural to talk about "structure" in a potential power 
theory. Underlying structure is conceptualized in terms of 
power-dependence relations (as, for example, in Emerson, 1962;
1972). Observed compliance (in either kind of theory) is an 
act-by-act phenomenon that is transient, issue-specific, 
incompletely connected, and intransitive. In describing it (in 
either theory) the idea of "structure" is illusory (cf. Polsby,
1980). Observed compliance only imperfectly reflects its underlying 
structure because it depends in part on potential power and in part 
on the utility of X to A and to B. Power-dependence relations, 
although they vary with the utility of A's resources to B and the 
number of alternatives available to B, do not depend on X. They are 
therefore more general (i.e., not issue-specific) and stable than 
observable compliance. In describing them the idea of "structure" 
is perfectly sensible.
There is nothing very deep about this: All it means is that 
the resources of A have the same utility for B no matter what it is 
that A wants B to do. What B actually does depends partly on his 
dependence on A, partly on the disutility of X to B, and sometimes
on the intensity of A's preferences for X. Power-dependence 
relations, on the other hand, depend only on the amount, perceived 
value, and concentration of resources. They are more general than 
acts because they are not issue-specific, more stable because they 
do not depend on the utility of X. The stability of power- 
dependence relations is only relative: It varies with B's goals,
B's alternatives, and A's stock of resources, all of which can and 
do change. But if one were to model power at both levels (acts and 
relations), compliance would be a variable but dependency would 
appear as a path-coefficient (measuring the rate of change in B's 
compliance caused by a unit change in the intensity of A's 
preferences). (See Alker, 1973; Harsanyi, 1962; Nagel, 1975.) It 
is only in this sense that it is (relatively) constant.
Because power-dependence relations are relatively stable and 
general, they naturally give rise to talk of "structure" even 
though, like acts, systems of them may be only partially-ordered.
In such theories, power "exists" whether or not its exercise, or 
even compliance with it, is observed. Such stable, issue-free 
elements make natural units for building up more complex, larger 
systems of relations. (Cf. Cook and Emerson, 1978.) Such larger 
systems are not necessarily completely connected or transitive. 
Resources distributed in them are not necessarily cumulative (as 
opposed to dispersed) (Dahl, 1961). They are no more unidimensional 
than acts. But such relations can be joined to each other, built 
into larger systems of relations, and spoken of in "structural"
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terms without pure solecism. It also makes sense to speak of them 
as having "structural" effects: The sheer distribution of resources 
produces consequences out of all proportion to their use, the 
intentions of power-holders, or awareness of their effects. Many 
males are shocked that some females feel oppressed; they are not 
aware of doing or intending anything oppressive. Many males don't: 
But the distribution of resources itself is capable of producing 
effects without regard to the motives of those who control them.
C. The Paradox of False Beliefs.
The structural effects just referred to arise from perceived, 
not objective, potential power. What if the perception is false? 
Suppose B believes in Santa Claus and does X because he believes 
Santa Claus prefers it. Do we want to attribute power to someone 
who does not exist? Suppose B is paranoid and becomes reclusive out 
of fear of assault by neighbors who are not even aware B exists. Do 
we want to attribute power to people who are not even aware of B 
simply because B believes in their threat? Suppose the number of 
people who believe in the internal communist threat is large. Are 
we required to say that the Communist Party of the United States has 
power? (Cf. Dahl, 1957; March, 1955; Nagel, 1975, ch. 2.)
The paradox of false belief (sometimes known as the "Santa 
Claus Paradox") is an obviously undesirable property for a theory to 
have. It is a close cousin of spurious power, which argues that a 
child at an intersection has power if oncoming traffic stops because
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he commands it to halt at the same moment that the traffic light 
changes to red (Dahl, 1957). Inferences from false belief will be 
spurious in the same sense, mistaking the causes of B's behavior for 
power where there is no power.
But the paradox arises only if perceived power is used in an 
atheoretical, ad hoc way, i.e., as an isolated hypothesis instead of 
as part of a theory (a systematically inter-related set of concepts 
and propositions). Ad hoc explanation is not logically impossible 
but it frequently leads an observer to commit nonsense. The 
solution of the paradox is to keep in mind, exactly as one must in 
relating observed compliance to power-dependence relations, that 
perceived potential power is one variable in a larger system of 
variables that jointly explain compliance. The relation between 
objective and subjective potential power is part of this theory. 
(See, for example, Bacharach and Lawler, 1976; Lawler and Bacharach, 
1979.) No one is in danger of inferring spurious power from false 
belief if this kind of theory displaces ad hoc explanations of 
power. If the ways in which objective power affect perceived 
potential power are part of the theory, the effects of false belief 
are clearly identified as spurious. This does not rid us of the 
effects of paranoia and superstition. All it does is treat it as 
idiosyncratic variation in amounts of power, as noise absorbed by 
residual error. But this will be unacceptable only if false beliefs 
have large, systematic, and correlated effects, which no one has 
claimed for them.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This paper is entirely concerned with the power of A over B, or 
what is sometimes called "micro" or "interpersonal" power, as 
distinct from "macro" power, the capacity of an organized group to 
assemble resources for the pursuit of group goals. (On the latter, 
see Hawley, 1963; Parsons, 1963.) This does not mean that we 
believe macro power (in this sense) is unimportant or that it is not 
power (even though it depends crucially on authority which in the 
present paper we distinguish from unwilling compliance, which we 
identify with "power"). The relation between the two kinds of power 
is discussed in Gamson, 1968 and Zelditch and Walker, 1984.
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